EVA BELLIN RECONSIDERING THE ROBUSTNESS PDF

Reconsidering the. Robustness of. Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Lessons from the Arab Spring. Eva Bellin. Valeriia Gladkaia, učo Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons Author Eva Bellin; Book or Journal Comparative Politics; Vol. ROA is still valid in explaining the Arab Spring. “the coercive apparatus capacity and will + the level of political mobilization are decisive”.

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However, each organ also had independent relationships, which produced independent strategic interests. Citations Publications citing this paper. Here’s an example of what they look like:. In fact, common arguments like empathy evw the protesting masses or political grievances against reconsidfring regime could apply to riot police as much as soldiers in tanks. In some cases, the regime deliberately orchestrated the rift e.

Authoritarianism Search for additional papers on this topic. Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Showing of 34 extracted citations. Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Sectarianism and coup-proofing strategies in Bahrain. Armed Forces in the Middle East London: The Relationship between the Military and Internal Security Agencies First, we will consider the clash of interests between the army and the Interior Ministry to illustrate how a legacy of distrust split the military and internal organizations.

If they had wanted, both could have acted in the same repressive manner in in Egypt and Tunisia—yet only one chose to do so, emphasizing a difference in strategic interests that surpassed any similarity in character. The explanatory differences are several. The impact of such a shift was evident even prior to the end of the cold war.

Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring

In ways, defection was a zero-sum game—the losses involved in sticking with the Ministry relative to the risks of defection losing the already meager economic livelihood and potential rejection and outrage were less.

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As a bdllin, it is robusrness to acknowledge that decision-making is not always possible to unravel and justify, especially when closed institutions like the military and Interior Ministry in a closed region like the Middle East are involved.

Briefly, the events unfolded in this order. Due to space reasons, this paper focuses primarily on the horizontal breakdown of the apparatus but acknowledges the rich insights that a vertical analysis might offer. Here, it is useful to acknowledge that the Arab Spring was unprecedented in its magnitude and anomalous in redonsidering impact. Ebllin Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Accessed March 22, In addition, militaries and security agencies considered the extent of their own dependency on the regime and their ability to exist and prevail without it.

It makes it easy to scan through your lists and keep track of progress. It has already been established that robustnees agency-army tussle over the years disenchanted the military but actually wooed and benefited the security forces.

Monday 31 December Preservation of Israel ‘ s security might be a third concernalthough it seems to be more an American than a fully western preoccupation. The split pitted the two organs on opposite sides; the regime chose to join the internal agencies, which meant that the split with the internal agencies also meant a split with the regime by proxy.

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Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Midd by Magdolin Harmina on Prezi

A defected soldier would be received with open arms and enthusiasm. Setting a reading intention helps you organise your reading. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

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Reconsiderong are also some lessons to be understood from works on civil-military relations. Brought to you by AQnowledgeprecision products for scientists. Conclusion and Looking Ahead On a robustness note, it is evident that the coercive apparatus in the two countries where the Arab Spring caused perhaps the most rupture was not only internally heterogeneous in structure but also in strategic interests and decision-making calculi.

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We will now consider some stimuli that did not necessarily arise from the inter-organ relationships but were legitimate concerns that influenced the security system and the military differently.

Journal of Strategic Studies 36, 2: Egypt and Tunisia serve as the primary pro-cases while China is considered as a counter-case fhe the end. Indeed, a major theme in this paper is time.

For one, the Chinese military and internal security forces did not have a history of strained ties. If you are interested in joining the mailing list, please use the signup link in the top right corner of this page! Among these, the crucial ones were internal cohesion in relation to the masses and post-revolt survival in relation to the regime.

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Hence, by substantially evz the conditions under which security forces chose to repress, sectarian cases disable comparison with cases like Egypt and Tunisia.